A Cumulative Approach to Ineffective Assistance: New York’s Requirement that Counsel’s Cumulative Efforts Amount to Meaningful Representation - People v. Bodden by Lucas, Jan
Touro Law Review 
Volume 28 




A Cumulative Approach to Ineffective Assistance: New York’s 
Requirement that Counsel’s Cumulative Efforts Amount to 
Meaningful Representation - People v. Bodden 
Jan Lucas 
Touro Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lucas, Jan (2013) "A Cumulative Approach to Ineffective Assistance: New York’s Requirement that 
Counsel’s Cumulative Efforts Amount to Meaningful Representation - People v. Bodden," Touro Law 
Review: Vol. 28 : No. 3 , Article 34. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/34 
This Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel is brought to you for free and open access by 
Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
A Cumulative Approach to Ineffective Assistance: New York’s Requirement that 
Counsel’s Cumulative Efforts Amount to Meaningful Representation - People v. 
Bodden 
Cover Page Footnote 
28-3 





A CUMULATIVE APPROACH TO  
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: 
 
NEW YORK’S REQUIREMENT THAT COUNSEL’S 
CUMULATIVE EFFORTS AMOUNT TO MEANINGFUL 
REPRESENTATION 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
People v. Bodden1 
(decided March 1, 2011) 
 
This case concerns a conviction that was overturned based on 
the appellant‘s receiving representation that amounted to ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  While the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel has been well established, and its parameters substantially 
defined, this case broadened the general scope.  The court did not 
find any particular action by defense counsel to have amounted to in-
effective assistance, but instead, by evaluating counsel‘s performance 
throughout the duration of the trial, the court held that the overall per-
formance was so lacking that the cumulative effect of counsel‘s con-
duct amounted to a violation of a criminal defendant‘s constitutional 
right to meaningful representation. 
I. ANALYSIS OF THIS CASE 
The appellant, Richard Bodden, appealed his conviction on 
two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, 
criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, reckless endan-
germent in the first degree, and harassment in the second degree.2  He 
 
1 918 N.Y.S.2d 141 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2011). 
2 Id. at 142. 
1
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also separately filed a motion pursuant to CPL § 440.103 in the trial 
court ―to vacate the judgment on the ground of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.‖4  When the trial court denied that motion, appellant ap-
pealed the denial, and the Appellate Division, Second Department 
consolidated the two appeals in this case.5  The court reversed the 
judgment as a matter of law, finding that the cumulative effect of de-
fense counsel‘s conduct throughout the trial amounted to a violation 
of appellant‘s constitutional right to meaningful representation.6 
The representation provided to the appellant was so lacking 
that the trial court, prior to sentencing, stated ―on the record that it 
was troubled by the defense counsel‘s performance during the trial.‖7  
Among the list of deplorable acts noted by the court were defense 
counsel‘s statements during jury selection–in front of prospective 
jury members–in which he distanced himself from his client, his fail-
ure to cross-examine an eyewitness in order to exploit weaknesses in 
direct testimony, and his use of an offensive term to describe the race 
of a person allegedly present at the time appellant was arrested.8  
When the court invited defense counsel to inspect photographs 
sought to be introduced by the prosecution, defense counsel declined, 
even though he ―acknowledge[ed] that he had not seen them before.‖9  
Defense counsel also ―offered to stipulate that a witness was ‗an ex-
pert on whatever you want him to testify to,‘ even though the witness 
was a fact witness.‖10  He also ―offered to stipulate to [the] entire tes-
timony [of another prosecution witness,] even though counsel ac-
knowledged that he had ‗no idea what the witness was going to testi-
fy to.‘ ‖11 
Defense counsel‘s closing statements primarily focused ―on 
the role of the jury in a democracy‖ with only ―cursory observations 
 
3 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(h) (McKinney 2010) (allowing judgment made in 
violation of defendant‘s state or federal constitutional rights to be vacated in favor of a new 
trial). 
4 Bodden, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 142. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 142-43 (―Under these circumstances, the defendant was deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel and, therefore, is entitled to a new trial‖).   
7 Id. at 142. 
8 Id. at 143. 
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about the [prosecution‘s] evidence;‖ there were serious weaknesses in 
that evidence which he failed to bring to the jury‘s attention.12  Also, 
during the prosecution‘s closing statements, defense counsel did not 
object to comments implying ―the defendant‘s character increased the 
likelihood that he committed the charged crimes.‖13  The court found 
that the cumulative effect of these actions resulted in appellant‘s de-
privation of effective assistance of counsel, and entitled him to a new 
trial.14 
In its reasoning, the court noted that under the New York 
standard, which it called ―somewhat more favorable to defendants‖15 
than the federal standard, the constitutional requirements ―are met 
when the defense attorney provides meaningful representation.‖16  
The focus is on the ―fairness of the process as a whole rather than its 
particular impact on the outcome of the case.‖17  In applying the New 
York rule, the court did not single out any particular act or error 
committed by counsel as an error that amounts to ineffective assis-
tance, but rather found that the cumulative effect of the frequent and 
obvious failings of counsel deprived the defendant of his right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel.18  Counsel‘s representation as a whole 
did not amount to the ―meaningful representation‖ that the defendant 
was entitled to, and rendered the judicial process unfair.19 
II. THE FEDERAL STANDARD 
In ruling that Richard Bodden had not received meaningful 
representation, the court upheld his right to effective assistance of 
counsel, a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.20  In interpreting this constitutional provi-
 
12 Id. 
13 Id.  
14 Bodden, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 143. 
15 Id. at 142 (quoting People v. Turner, 840 N.E.2d 123, 126 (N.Y. 2005)). 
16 Id. (quoting People v. Stultz, 810 N.E.2d 883, 884 (N.Y. 2004)). 
17 Id. at 143 (quoting People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 588 (N.Y. 1998)). 
18 Id. 
19 Bodden, 918 N.Y.S.2d 142-43.  While the New York standard does not require a show-
ing of prejudice, and the court did not identify whether it found counsel‘s actions to be pre-
judicial, it can hardly be argued, after all of counsel‘s errors and failures, that the jury would 
not have been prejudiced by his performance.  Id. at 143. 
20 The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part: ―In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
3
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sion, the Supreme Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright21 that it not 
only mandates provision of counsel to defendants in federal criminal 
trials, but also obligates the states to provide counsel to defendants in 
criminal trials in state courts.22  The Court further required in Strick-
land v. Washington23 that the assistance provided by counsel to the 
defendant must be ―reasonably effective.‖24  ―The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel‘s con-
duct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process 
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.‖25 
In determining whether counsel‘s representation was ineffec-
tive, the Court in Strickland established a two-part test.26  The defen-
dant must prove that counsel‘s performance was deficient, which ―re-
quires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the ‗counsel‘ guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.‖27  The defendant must also show that the defi-
cient performance of counsel prejudiced the defense, which ―requires 
showing that counsel‘s errors were so serious as to deprive the defen-
dant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.‖28 
In evaluating whether counsel‘s performance was actually de-
ficient, the court must examine the facts of that particular case and 
counsel‘s chosen course of conduct, viewed as of the time of the con-
duct–without the added clarity of hindsight–and determine whether it 
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms.29  The court‘s ―scrutiny of counsel‘s performance 
must be highly deferential,‖ thus indulging ―a strong presumption 
that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable pro-
fessional assistance.‖30  To prove that the deficiency of counsel‘s per-
formance prejudiced the defense, ―[t]he defendant must show that 
 
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.‖  U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI. 
21 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
22 Id. at 344. 
23 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
24 Id. at 687. 
25 Id. at 686. 
26 Id. at 687. 
27 Id. 
28 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
29 Id. at 689. 
30 Id.  
4
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there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‖31  In 
determining whether counsel‘s performance resulted in the required 
prejudice, the court must consider the totality of the evidence before 
the judge or jury, and ―ask if the defendant has met the burden of 
showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been 
different absent the errors.‖32  The defendant must prove that coun-
sel‘s performance was both deficient and that it prejudiced the de-
fense; failure to prove either part results in dismissal of the claim.33 
A. Types of Errors That Constitute Ineffective 
Assistance 
In Henry v. Poole,34 the Second Circuit held that a single error 
made by defense counsel can amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.35  When counsel advances a false alibi–an alibi for a period 
of time after the crime, but not covering the actual time of the crime–
and relies on that false alibi throughout the trial, and in summation 
acknowledges that the alibi is not for the actual time of the crime, that 
error amounts to a reasonable probability that counsel‘s conduct was 
deficient, especially if counsel had reason to know, prior to the start 
of the trial, that the alibi was false.36  Similarly, when such false alibi 
is so relied on, and its falsity is so clearly obvious to the jury, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the outcome of the trial would be preju-
 
31 Id. at 694. 
32 Id. at 696. 
33 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.  In applying the new standard to the facts of the case before 
it, the Court held that counsel‘s strategic choice to rely as fully as possible on his client‘s 
statements during pleading, and not investigating or introducing further character or psycho-
logical evidence, was reasonable, because it precluded the prosecution from countering any 
such evidence with more damning evidence of the client‘s criminal record.  Id. at 698-701.  
Thus, failing to investigate or introduce evidence that could be of benefit to the client is not 
necessarily proof of deficient performance if counsel reasonably believed that not introduc-
ing such evidence, and so precluding the prosecution from introducing counter-evidence that 
is more detrimental, would serve the client better than the benefit of having the evidence in-
troduced.  See id.  Based on this determination, the Court held that counsel‘s representation 
was not deficient, and so the client failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance.  Id. 
34 409 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2005). 
35 See id. at 64. 
36 Id. at 64-65. 
5
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diced by counsel‘s advancement of the false alibi.37  As such, the 
court held that counsel‘s representation fell below the standard for ef-
fective assistance.38 
In Cox v. Donnelly,39 the Second Circuit held that counsel‘s 
failure to object to a court‘s unconstitutional jury instruction on the 
intent component of the charge of murder can amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel.40  In doing so, the court emphasized the signi-
ficance of whether the intent component was a central issue on which 
the conviction depended.41  In a prior case, Tsirizotakis v. LeFevre,42 
the Second Circuit held that failure to object to a constitutionally de-
fective intent instruction can be strategic, in that counsel might not 
want to make an issue of intent, as it would detract from the primary 
defense of justification.43  However, in Cox, where the conviction de-
pended solely on the issue of intent, failing to object to the defective 
jury instruction did amount to deficient performance.44  And, given 
that the issue of intent was so central to the case, and the fact that the 
jury twice asked for clarification on the issue of intent, counsel‘s fail-
ure to object to the defective instruction resulted in prejudice that rea-
sonably could have affected the outcome of the case.45 
Other failures of counsel that amount to ineffective assistance, 
as held in Carrion v. Smith,46 are ―fail[ure] to advise [the client] of 
the sentencing exposure he faced if he were convicted at trial,‖ and 
―fail[ure] to give [the client] advice regarding the advisability of ac-
cepting the plea offer that was sufficiently robust under the circums-
tances.‖47  When counsel breaches a fundamental duty to the client, 
 
37 Id. at 66-67. 
38 Id. at 67. 
39 387 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2004). 
40 Id. at 200. 
41 Id. at 199 (―[H]ere, intent was not only at issue, it was the sole issue on which [defen-
dant]‘s conviction depended at the time the defective instruction was given. . . . We therefore 
cannot accept the state‘s argument that counsel abandoned the issue of [defendant]‘s intent 
as a tactical maneuver.‖). 
42 736 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1984). 
43 Id. at 63. 
44 Cox, 387 F.3d at 199-200. 
45 Id. 
46 644 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
47 Id. at 467 (―When a plea offer is made and there is a reasonable probability that the de-
fendant is uncertain about the sentencing exposure he faces, whether or not he accepts the 
plea, a lawyer unquestionably has a duty to inform his client of the sentencing exposure he 
6
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such as loyalty, confidentiality, or in this case, the duty to inform the 
client of sentencing exposure, counsel‘s assistance falls below the ob-
jective level of reasonableness.48 
III. THE NEW YORK STANDARD 
In addition to the right to counsel guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution, defendants in criminal trials in New York State 
courts are also guaranteed the right to counsel by the New York State 
Constitution.49  The Court of Appeals stated in People v. Baldi,50 
three years before the Supreme Court would rule on this issue, that 
―[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by 
both the Federal and [New York] State Constitutions. . . .‖51  ―[T]he 
right ‗means more than just having a person with a law degree nomi-
nally represent (defendant) upon a trial and ask questions.‘ ‖52 
The Court recognized at that time that the lower courts had 
developed two different standards for reviewing effectiveness of 
counsel.53  ―The traditional standard has been whether the attorney‘s 
shortcomings were such as to render the ‗trial a farce and a mockery 
 
faces if he accepts the plea offer and if he does not.‖). 
48 Id.  Criminal defendants are also entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the pre-
trial and appellate phases of their case.  See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (hold-
ing that the Strickland ―test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.‖); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404, 1410 (2012) (holding that a 
criminal defendant‘s right to effective assistance of ―counsel extends to the negotiation and 
consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected.‖); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 
1385 (2012) (holding that a criminal defendant, who claims ineffective assistance of counsel 
during plea consideration, must show ―that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a 
reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court . . . that the 
court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the 
offer‘s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact 
were imposed.‖); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (holding that criminal defen-
dants have a right to effective assistance of appellate counsel on first appeal); Smith v. Rob-
bins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (holding that the proper standard for reviewing claims of in-
effective assistance of appellate counsel is that enunciated in Strickland). 
49 The New York Constitution states, in pertinent part: ―In any trial in any court whatever 
the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civ-
il actions. . . .‖  N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
50 429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1981). 
51 Id. at 404. 
52 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 586 (quoting People v. Bennett, 280 N.E.2d 637, 639 (N.Y. 
1972)). 
53 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 404. 
7
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of justice.‘ ‖54  The other standard, which the court described as stric-
ter, was whether counsel exhibited ―reasonable competence.‖55  The 
court departed from the ―farce or mockery‖ test, and adopted the 
―stricter‖ standard–that of ―meaningful representation.‖56  ―Under the 
[New York] State Constitution, ‗prejudice‘ is examined more gener-
ally in the context of whether defendant received meaningful repre-
sentation.‖57  Counsel‘s conduct must amount to ―egregious and pre-
judicial‖ error such that defendant did not receive a fair trial.58  
However, the focus of the inquiry is on the fairness of the trial, not on 
prejudice—whether counsel‘s representation, be it prejudicial or not, 
resulted in the defendant receiving a fair trial.59 
In determining whether the standard was met, the court re-
quired that ―the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particu-
lar case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, 
reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation . . . .‖60  
Further, in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance, the court must 
take care ―to avoid both confusing true ineffectiveness [of counsel] 
with mere losing tactics and according undue significance to retros-
pective analysis.‖61  Instead, ― ‗it is incumbent on defendant to dem-
onstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations‘ for 
counsel‘s alleged shortcomings.‖62 
The court noted that counsel ―is not required to argue factual 
innocence at the expense of a stronger defense,‖ and can reasonably 
argue ―his client‘s factual innocence, or his insanity, or both,‖ espe-
cially if the factual innocence argument is weak.63  Counsel‘s perfor-
mance does not amount to ineffective assistance merely for being 
―unable . . . to shake [a prosecution witness‘s] criticism of his less 
experienced colleagues‘ [conclusions] or to induce him to modify his 
 
54 Id. (quoting People v. Aiken, 380 N.E.2d 272, 274 (N.Y. 1978)). 
55 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405. 
56 Id. 
57 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588. 
58 Id. (quoting People v. Flores, 639 N.E.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. 1994)). 
59 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588. 
60 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405. 
61 Id. 
62 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587 (quoting People v. Rivera, 525 N.E.2d 698, 700 (N.Y. 
1988)). 
63 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405. 
8
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own conclusion . . .‖ during a weak cross-examination.64  Counsel‘s 
taking the witness stand and giving testimony contradicting his client 
does not render his assistance ineffective if the testimony serves ―a 
proper purpose[, such as] the establishment of [an] insanity de-
fense.‖65  Nor is it improper for counsel to state in summation that 
counsel ―decline[s] to vouch for [the] client‘s credibility,‖ when the 
weaknesses in the prosecution‘s case is still argued, and defenses 
emphasized.66 
Similarly, in People v. Satterfield,67 counsel decided not to in-
troduce evidence to impeach a witness, but instead chose to argue 
that the witness‘s statement placing defendant at the crime scene was 
a misidentification.68  Impeaching the credibility of that witness‘s ac-
count of the events would have worked against the defense, because 
counsel attempted to establish that the account was correct, apart 
from the misidentification.69  The court held that such decisions fall 
within the spectrum of strategic options counsel may pursue, and 
does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.70  Counsel‘s 
subjective reasons for choosing a certain trial strategy are immaterial 
to a determination of whether the assistance provided was effective.71  
Rather, when viewed objectively, if the facts and circumstances of 
the case reveal the existence of a trial strategy that might be pursued 
by a reasonably competent attorney, that is sufficient to dismiss a 
claim of ineffective assistance.72 
In People v. Benevento,73 the Court of Appeals emphasized 
that counsel‘s assistance is not ineffective purely because it does not 
result in the client‘s acquittal.74  While the client is entitled to mea-
 
64 Id. at 406. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  Based on these determinations, the court held that counsel‘s conduct was not unrea-
sonable and did not ―ma[k]e a farce [or] mockery of the trial,‖ and so ―it simply cannot be 
said as a matter of law that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.‖  Id. at 407. 
67 488 N.E.2d 834 (N.Y. 1985). 
68 Id. at 836-37. 
69 Id. at 836. 
70 Id. at 836-37. 
71 Id. at 836. 
72 Satterfield, 488 N.E.2d at 836. 
73 697 N.E.2d 584 (N.Y. 1998). 
74 Id. at 588.  This inference, logical as it is, was at the heart of the defendant‘s claim of 
ineffective assistance, and the court went to a great length to clearly state this point.  Id. 
9
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ningful representation, that representation does not have to be perfect 
or errorless.75  Even with perfect representation, a defendant in a 
criminal trial can still be convicted.  Therefore, counsel‘s assistance 
does not have to be perfect, and the outcome of the representation is 
not dispositive as to its effectiveness.76  Where counsel set a clear and 
reasonable strategy from opening remarks through summation, that 
strategy cannot be questioned as ineffective merely because the client 
was convicted, even if counsel stated during the opening that the 
client will testify and later decides not to call the client to the stand.77 
In People v. Turner,78 the Court of Appeals held that a single 
failing in an otherwise flawless representation by counsel can be ―so 
‗egregious and prejudicial‘ ‖ that it would deprive the client of the 
right to effective assistance.79  While errors such as ―overlooking a 
useful piece of evidence‖ or ―failing to take maximum advantage of a 
Rosario violation‖ would not necessarily in and of itself amount to 
the degree of prejudice so as to result in ineffective assistance, there 
are other errors that would.80  One such error is failure to raise a de-
fense that is clear-cut and completely dispositive, such as a lapsed 
statute of limitations.81  The court held that such a failure, absent a 
reasonable explanation, does amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.82 
But the defense must also be viable for it to amount to inef-
fective assistance if counsel fails to raise it.83  Failure to submit an af-
firmative defense that, if successful, would have been a complete de-
fense to the crimes charged, does not necessarily amount to 
ineffective assistance if counsel had reason to believe the defense 
 
75 Id. at 587. 
76 Id. at 588. 
77 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588-89. 
78 840 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2005). 
79 Id. at 126 (quoting People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213, 220 (N.Y. 2005)). 
80 Turner, 840 N.E.2d at 126.  The Rosario rule is an adoption of the federal Jencks rule, 
under which defense counsel may examine for itself a witness‘ prior statements which is in 
the prosecution‘s possession, regardless of whether it comports with the witness‘ testimony 
at trial, so long as those prior statements relates to the subject matter of the witness‘ testimo-
ny at trial, and contained no confidential information.  People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881, 
883 (N.Y. 1961). 
81 Turner, 840 N.E.2d at 126. 
82 Id. 
83 People v. Georgiou, 828 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544-45 (App. Div. 2d. Dep‘t 2007). 
10
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would not prevail.84  ―There can be no denial of effective assistance 
of . . . counsel arising from counsel‘s failure to ‗make a motion or ar-
gument that ha[d] little or no chance of success.‘ ‖85  In People v. 
Georgiou86 the Appellate Division, Second Department held that ―the 
mere fact that the defendant would have been entitled to submit the 
affirmative defense had his counsel requested it, does not, in and of 
itself, prove that he was denied effective assistance‖ of counsel.87  
The court said that while it was surely an error on the part of counsel 
not to submit the affirmative defense to the jury, there was sufficient 
evidence to determine that the omission was a harmless error, which 
had little to no effect on the outcome of the case, and as such, did not 
impact the fairness of the trial.88 
IV. THE STANDARD IN OTHER STATES 
The overwhelming majority of states have adopted the Strick-




85 People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213, 220 (N.Y. 2005) (quoting Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 890). 
86 828 N.Y.S.2d 541(App. Div. 2d. Dep‘t 2007). 
87 Id. at 545. 
88 Id. at 546. 
89 JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY M. BURKOFF, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL § 2:5 
n.3 (2011); Alabama: Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Ala. 1987) (―Under the stan-
dards enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, and adopted by this Court in Ex parte Bald-
win, a two-pronged test must be met before a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
proven.‖); Arizona: State v. Nash, 694 P.2d 222, 227 (Ariz.1985) (―This Court adopted the 
second prong of Strickland in Lee.  We now believe it is time to adopt Strickland‘s first 
prong as well.‖); Arkansas: Pogue v. State, 872 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Ark. 1994) (―For those 
claims of ineffective counsel that we are able to reach, they must be examined in light of the 
standard set in Strickland v. Washington.‖); California: People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839, 
868 (Cal. 1987) (―In addition to showing that counsel‘s performance was deficient, a crimi-
nal defendant must also establish prejudice before he can obtain relief on an ineffective-
assistance claim.  The United States Supreme Court expressly enunciated this requirement in 
Strickland.  And we implied as much in Fosselman.‖); Colorado: People v. Valdez, 789 P.2d 
406, 410 (Colo. 1990) (―The two-prong test enunciated in Strickland is designed to preserve 
the right to effective assistance of counsel in light of the primary basis for such right—the 
assurance that at all critical stages of the adjudicative process a criminal defendant 
represented by counsel is in fact represented by an attorney of sufficient quality to ensure 
that the process itself is fundamentally fair.‖); Connecticut: Quintana v. Warden, State Pris-
on, 593 A.2d 964, 965 (Conn. 1991) (―The . . . court concluded that the appropriate standard 
for examining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in Strickland v. Wash-
ington. . . .‖); Delaware: Smith v. State, 991 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Del. 2010) (―Ineffective assis-
11
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tance of counsel claims are reviewed pursuant to the two-pronged standard established by 
the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.‖); Florida: Stephens v. State, 
748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999) (―The determination of ineffectiveness pursuant to Strick-
land is a two-pronged analysis: (1) whether counsel‘s performance was deficient; and (2) 
whether the defendant was prejudiced thereby.‖); Georgia: Turpin v. Christenson, 497 
S.E.2d 216, 222 (Ga. 1998) (―The Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the Strickland test in 
Smith v. Francis.‖); Idaho: Estrada v. State, 149 P.3d 833, 838 (Idaho 2006) (―The United 
States Supreme Court established the standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel in Strickland v. Washington.‖); Illinois: People v. Albanese, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255 (Ill. 
1984) (―Although we do not foresee that application of the Strickland rule will produce re-
sults that vary significantly from those reached under Greer, we hereby adopt the Supreme 
Court rule for challenges to effectiveness of both retained and appointed counsel. . . .‖); In-
diana: Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ind. 2002) (―Under Strickland v. Washing-
ton, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that: (1) counsel‘s per-
formance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness based on 
prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel‘s performance prejudiced the defendant so 
much that ‗there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.‘ ‖ (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)); 
Iowa: State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Iowa 2004) (―Failure to prove either prong of 
the Strickland test results in failure of the defendant‘s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim.‖); Kansas: Chamberlain v. State, 694 P.2d 468, 475 (Kan. 1985) (―While the actual 
application of the standards from Schoonover as opposed to those of [Strickland] would in 
all probability effect the same result in any given case, we deem it appropriate to now adopt 
the [Strickland] holdings as the prevailing yardstick to be used in measuring the effective-
ness of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.‖); Kentucky: See Norton v. Com., 63 S.W.3d 
175, 177 (Ky. 2001) (―Thus, it appears that the . . . [court in Robbins] attempt[ed] to rephrase 
the Strickland standard, not to revise it.  Nonetheless, we are compelled to overrule Robbins 
to the extent that it conflicts with Strickland, albeit inadvertently.‖); Louisiana: State v. 
Lentz, 844 So. 2d 837, 840 n.2 (La. 2003) (―Under the standard for ineffective assistance of 
counsel set out in Strickland and adopted by this court in State v. Washington, a reviewing 
court must reverse a conviction if the defendant establishes that counsel‘s performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and 
counsel‘s inadequate performance prejudiced defendant to the extent that the trial was ren-
dered unfair and the verdict suspect.‖); Maine: Brewer v. Hagemann, 771 A.2d 1030, 1033 
(Me. 2001) (―We apply the Strickland standard in ineffective assistance of counsel cases.‖); 
Maryland: State v. Colvin, 548 A.2d 506, 517 (Md. 1988) (―The standards established in 
Strickland apply to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under art. 21 [of the Maryland 
Constitution].‖); Michigan: People v. Toma, 613 N.W.2d 694, 710 (Mich. 2000) (―The 
Michigan Supreme Court in Pickens adopted the Strickland version of what constitutes error 
requiring reversal from ineffective assistance of counsel.‖); Minnesota: State v. Rhodes, 657 
N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (―We analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims under 
a two-prong test set forth in Strickland.‖); Mississippi: Stringer v. State, 627 So. 2d 326, 332 
(Miss. 1993) (―This Court has adopted the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel set out in Strickland.‖); Missouri: See Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Mo. 2002) 
(―To the extent that the cases relied on by the State and other Missouri cases apply a differ-
ent standard, they are inconsistent with Strickland and should no longer be followed.‖); 
Montana: State v. Henderson, 93 P.3d 1231, 1233 (Mont. 2004) (―We have adopted the two-
part Strickland test for measuring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.‖); Nebraska: 
State v. Miner, 733 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Neb. 2007) (―With regard to the questions of coun-
sel‘s performance or prejudice to the defendant as part of the two-pronged test articulated in 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 3, Art. 34
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/34
  
2012] INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1085 
 
 
Strickland v. Washington, an appellate court reviews such legal determinations independent-
ly of the lower court‘s decision.‖); Nevada: Means v. State, 103 P.3d 25, 31-32 (Nev. 2004) 
(―[W]e evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the test established in 
Strickland v. Washington.‖); New Hampshire: State v. Faragi, 498 A.2d 723, 726 (N.H. 
1985) (―More recently, however, we have followed the standard set out in Strickland v. 
Washington. . . .‖); New Jersey: State v. DiFrisco, 645 A.2d 734, 783 (N.J. 1994) (―This 
Court has adopted the Strickland standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel 
under the right to counsel provided in the New Jersey Constitution.‖); New Mexico: State v. 
Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004) (―The two-part standard delineated in Strickland v. 
Washington, applies to ineffective-assistance claims. . . .‖); North Carolina: State v. Bras-
well, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (N.C. 1985) (―Therefore, we expressly adopt the test set out in 
Strickland v. Washington as a uniform standard to be applied to measure ineffective assis-
tance of counsel under the North Carolina Constitution.‖); North Dakota: Flanagan v. State, 
712 N.W.2d 602, 607 (N.D. 2006) (―In Woehlhoff v. State, this Court said we use the same 
Strickland test to assess ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the state constitu-
tion.‖); Ohio: see State v. Bradley, 538 N.E.2d 373, 379 (Ohio 1989) (―This standard is es-
sentially the same as the one enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington.‖); Oklahoma: Gilson v. State, 8 P.3d 883, 926 n.9 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) 
(―Therefore, pursuant to Williams, our analysis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
is based solely upon the two prong test set forth in Strickland. . . .‖); Pennsylvania: Com. v. 
Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 976 (Pa. 1987) (―The obvious identical textual and policy considera-
tions in Maroney and Strickland logically lead us to hold that together they constitute the 
same rule.  Our decisions in Maroney and its progeny, therefore, do not create greater or 
lesser protection under Article I, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, than the 
present federal standard.‖); Rhode Island: Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 171 (R.I. 2001) 
(―This Strickland Test, as adopted in Barboza v. State, provides certain criteria that a com-
plaining applicant must establish in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel.‖); South 
Carolina: Caprood v. State, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (S.C. 2000) (―Strickland set forth a two-
prong test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel, adopted by this Court in Cher-
ry.‖); South Dakota: Ice v. Weber, 638 N.W.2d 557, 561 (S.D. 2002) ( ―In reviewing inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims, this Court has adopted the two-part test set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington.‖); Tennessee: Dean v. State, 59 S.W.3d 663, 667 (Tenn. 2001) 
(―A constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the familiar 
standards of Baxter v. Rose, and Strickland v. Washington.‖); Texas: Hernandez v. State, 726 
S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (―In short, our constitutional and statutory provi-
sions do not create a standard in ineffective assistance cases that is more protective of a de-
fendant‘s rights than the standard put forward by the Supreme Court in Strickland.  Accor-
dingly, we will follow in full the Strickland standards in determining effective assistance and 
prejudice resulting therefrom.‖); Utah: Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993) 
(―To prevail, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must meet both parts of 
the Strickland test.‖); Vermont: State v. Lemire, 640 A.2d 541, 542 (Vt. 1994) (―The Strick-
land standard applies to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.‖); Virginia: 
Yarbrough v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 609 S.E.2d 30, 37 (Va. 2005) (―To prevail on 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must . . . satisfy both parts of the 
two-part test established in Strickland.‖); Washington: State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015, 
1018 (Wash. 2011) (―[T]he defendant must satisfy the familiar two-part Strickland v. Wash-
ington test for ineffective assistance claims. . . .‖); West Virginia: State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 
114, 126 (W. Va. 1995) (―We now make it explicit, in the West Virginia courts, claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are to be governed by the two-pronged test established in 
Strickland.‖); Wisconsin: State v. Sanchez, 548 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Wis. 1996) (―[W]e conclude 
13
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New York, however, is not alone in having a different stan-
dard.  For example, Alaska has its own standard, articulated in Risher 
v State.90  This standard basically mirrors the Strickland standard, but 
does not require a showing of a ―reasonable probability‖ that coun-
sel‘s error(s) affected the outcome of the case, which requires a high-
er standard of representation than the prejudice prong in Strickland.91  
―Risher requires only that the accused create a reasonable doubt that 
counsel‘s incompetence contributed to the conviction, [whereas] 
Strickland requires that a ‗reasonable probability‘ of a different out-
come be established.‖92  Similarly, Oregon only requires that ―coun-
sel‘s failure [have] a tendency to affect the result of his trial,‖ which 
is easier to meet than Strickland‘s requirement that defendant show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s prejudicial ineffective-
ness, defendant would not have lost at trial.93  Hawaii also uses its 
own standard which requires ―(1) that there were specific errors or 
omissions reflecting counsel‘s lack of skill, judgment, or diligence; 
and (2) that such errors or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal 
or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.‖94  
The Hawaii Supreme Court has upheld this standard, in preference to 
Strickland, because its view is that it better protects defendants‘ 
―right to effective assistance of counsel‖ under the Hawaii Constitu-
tion.95  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court requires a ―show-
ing that better work might have accomplished something material for 
the defense,‖96 and that ―[r]ather than merely unreasonable, we re-
quire that challenged tactical judgments must be ‗manifestly unrea-
sonable.‘ ‖97 
 
that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland . . . should also be 
the test for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under our state constitution.‖); Wyom-
ing: Asch v. State, 62 P.3d 945, 950 (Wyo. 2003) (―Under the two-prong standard articulated 
in Strickland . . . an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on 
the record that counsel‘s performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted.‖). 
90 523 P.2d 421, 425 (Alaska 1974). 
91 Benefield v. State, No. A-5832, 1996 WL 671359, at *2 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 20, 
1996). 
92 State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 572 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
93 Lichau v. Baldwin, 39 P.3d 851, 857 (Or. 2002); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
94 State v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 (Haw. 1992). 
95 Id. at 1305 n.2. 
96 Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 364 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (Mass. 1977). 
97 Commonwealth v. White, 565 N.E.2d 1185, 1190 (Mass. 1991) (quoting Common-
wealth v. Adams, 375 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Mass. 1978)). 
14
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V. COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL AND NEW YORK 
STANDARDS, AND POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 
In comparing the federal and New York State approaches to 
this issue, it is noteworthy that the New York approach, first articu-
lated in Baldi, predates the federal approach adopted in Strickland, 
and that New York has retained Baldi in preference to the federal 
standard.98  The prejudice prong articulated in Strickland is what se-
parates the federal and New York State approaches.99  The Baldi test 
is not indifferent as to whether the client was prejudiced by counsel‘s 
ineffectiveness, but the client need not fully satisfy the prejudice 
prong of the Strickland test in order to prevail.100  New York courts 
still regard the client‘s showing of prejudice as significant, but it is 
not an indispensable element in determining whether the representa-
tion was meaningful.101  The focus, instead, is on the fairness of the 
proceedings as a whole, and not just on whether the ineffectiveness of 
counsel‘s representation prejudiced the outcome.102  Thus, the Baldi 
test is more favorable to defendants in that it makes it easier to pre-
vail on a claim of ineffective assistance.103 
The Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants with the 
right to counsel to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.104  
This was the established rule in federal courts, and, in Gideon, the 
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment placed the same 
obligation on the states.105  Prior to Strickland, states could claim ad-
 
98 Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 886. 




103 Turner, 840 N.E.2d at 125-26. 
104 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-40.  
The Sixth Amendment provides, ‗In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence.‘  We have construed this to mean that in federal courts counsel 
must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right 
is competently and intelligently waived. 
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 459 (1938)). 
105 Id. at 343.  
[T]he Court reemphasized what it had said about the fundamental nature 
of the right to counsel in this language: ‗We concluded that certain funda-
mental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal 
15
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herence to the rule simply by requiring that ―a warm body with a law 
degree‖ be placed next to the defendant.106  In Strickland, the Court 
could have articulated a rule that would have required states to pro-
vide actual meaningful representation, as the ends of justice demand.  
However, in its attempt not to limit the potential options of attorneys 
to defend their clients, the Court adopted a standard that is so high 
that the only instances where attorneys‘ conduct have been found to 
be ineffective are such an affront to justice that no reasonable person 
could argue against it. 
By creating such a high standard, and the resulting burden for 
defendants to overcome, the Court allows for such a low quality of 
representation to be deemed acceptable that defendants might very 
well be deprived of their rights.  It certainly is a very complicated 
balance between giving attorneys latitude to attempt whatever strate-
gy they believe best serves their clients, and protecting the rights of 
the clients from poor representation by their attorneys.  But at what 
point does giving attorneys so much latitude in their strategy–to the 
point where they can just do the bare minimum necessary to meet the 
standard–become an affront to justice, and an insult to our legal sys-
tem? 
The government, both federal and state, allocates significant 
funding to the prosecution, yet public defenders are chronically un-
derfunded and understaffed.107  It is certainly not popular politically 
to increase funding to attorneys defending the indigent, and often, 
when budgets are cut, that funding is the first to be reduced.108  The 
result being that the right to a defense attorney to assist a defendant at 
trial, at least for the indigent, has become the right to have an over-
worked and underpaid attorney who often does not have the time or 
the resources to best represent the client.  Justice has become a lux-
ury, something only the rich can afford. 
 
action, were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of 
law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamen-
tal right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.‘   
Id. (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936)). 
106 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 586 (quoting Bennett, 280 N.E.2d at 639); Richard Klein, 
The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1446 
(1999). 
107 See Klein, supra note 106, at 1442-43. 
108 Id. 
16
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The New York rule, being somewhat more favorable to de-
fendants, makes it easier for clients to prove that they were not given 
effective assistance, but the standard for what is deemed acceptable is 
essentially the same as that of Strickland.  While the focus is on the 
overall fairness of the trial, and not just the outcome of the case, at-
torneys‘ actions must still be so egregious that it undermines the fair-
ness of the trial before the courts will step in.  Thus, instead of striv-
ing to give every citizen the best representation, attorneys are given 
free rein to do as they wish, so long as they keep above the bare min-
imum.  This seems to be a very small step away from the ―farce and 
mockery of justice‖ test that the Court of Appeals abandoned in Bal-
di. 
Of the other states, forty-five have also adopted Strickland 
outright as the standard to evaluate challenges to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel under their state constitutions.109  Also, the five 
states that use their own tests, which includes New York, still only 
hold attorneys accountable to the same level as Strickland, with the 
difference being only in the level of proof that the client needs in or-
der to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance.110  Thus, in all fifty 
states, as well as federal courts, the minimum level of performance 
by an attorney that is deemed to be acceptable is the same.  The New 
York test, with its requirement that the representation be ―meaning-
ful,‖ comes closest to being a higher standard, but with the interpreta-
tion of ―meaningful‖ being, in practice, essentially the same as Strick-
land‘s standard of ―objective reasonableness,‖ it, too, falls short. 
In an ideal situation, with a truly adversarial system, both 
sides would be equal.  The attorneys would be of equal skill, with 
equal funding and resources available to both.  That, though, is not 
the system we have.  We require not that criminal defendants receive 
a perfect trial, but settle for one which is deemed fair.  Fairness is as-
sumed, unless there are obvious errors.  And even in such cases, the 
error must be so egregious that it either prejudices the jury, or affects 
the fairness of the judicial process as a whole, in order for the defen-
dant to be granted relief.  With court dockets as overloaded as they 
are, it is understandable that the judiciary seeks to limit the number of 
cases that have to be retried, but certainly judicial economy cannot be 
 
109 See supra text accompanying note 89. 
110 See supra text accompanying note 89. 
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more important than protecting the rights and liberties of the citize-
nry. 
It would be easy to argue that more funding would improve 
the situation.  With more funding, public defenders‘ offices could 
hire more attorneys, and allow more time and resources to be spent 
on each individual case.  But, as in most problems, simply throwing 
money at it might help mitigate, but will not solve the issue.  The 
problem is not only that indigent defendants are often given a lower 
standard of representation than what should be acceptable; the bigger 
problem is that society does not seem to care that this is happening. 
The legal profession is considered to be self-regulating.111  
Therefore, even where society at large turns a blind eye, the legal 
profession itself should seek to improve the service it provides to the 
public.  Attorneys are required to provide their client with ―compe-
tent representation.‖112  Where exactly ―competent representation‖ 
falls on the spectrum of ―objectively reasonable‖ and ―meaningful 
representation‖ is unclear, but the legal profession can hold itself to a 
higher standard than that which is required by the courts.  Where at-
torneys provide their clients with deficient representation, the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct are violated even though their conduct 
may not have prejudiced their client. Even if the courts do not deem 
the level of representation to be ineffective, the bar could still require 
its members to improve.113 
Increased funding, which, under the current economic climate 
seems difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, would not in-and-of-
itself result in the desired increase in attorneys‘ level of performance.  
Nor would professional requirement of higher performance indepen-
dently solve the problem.  A combined approach would be a good 
start.  However, given the realities of the present, a more reasonable 
solution may yet lie with the courts. 
 
111 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.3 cmt. 1 (―Self-regulation of the legal 
profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when 
they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.‖). 
112 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (―A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, tho-
roughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.‖). 
113 See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise Of The 
Constitutional Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 
681-92 (1986). 
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In the past, clients had to prove that there were one or mul-
tiple instances during their representation that their attorneys‘ errors 
amounted to unreasonably deficient assistance.  In Bodden, the court 
did not require there to be an individual act or omission that was so 
egregious as to amount to ineffective assistance by itself.  Instead, the 
overall level of representation was so poor, and the errors so frequent, 
that the court could not but find that the cumulative effect of the er-
rors was unreasonable.  This is a shift away from the requirement that 
there be an error or omission that in itself is deemed unreasonable in 
order to satisfy the Baldi test, and instead evaluates the overall level 
of representation throughout the trial as a whole to determine if it met 
the standard.  Such a shift could be a step in the right direction.  If it 
is no longer acceptable for attorneys to do the bare minimum for their 
clients so long as they do not commit any particularly atrocious error, 
but instead have to maintain an overall performance that is consi-
dered reasonable, it is possible that the right to effective representa-
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